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THE MEANING OF THE BROWNING OF AMERICA 
I wanted, first of all, to thank Aida 
Rodriguez of the Rockefeller Foundation and 
Diana Campoamor, Director of Hispanics in 
Philanthropy for inviting me to address you here 
tonight. 
In the course of the last three weeks, we 
have talked several times about the issues 
facing you as Latinos and as people concerned 
about the future of Latinos in the world of 
philanthropy. In the process of these 
discussions, I lost whatever nervousness I may 
have had about addressing you because I realized 
that your questions and your struggle is not 
different from mine in the academy and the world 
of policy, or for that matter, from that of 
many, many Latinos across the United States in 
their daily lives. 
Many of you are in the same position that 
many of us are in the academy or at the 
community level. We have two jobs. That of 
doing the work we are paid to do- be it research 
or anything else- as well as developing the 
awareness of those around us of the particular 
needs of Latinos in the hopes of having the 
community receive a more equitable treatment. 
In my experience, there is no other way to 
accomplish both jobs and remain sane without 
getting together with others in the same 
situation and discussing strategies and action. 
I salute you in your organization and hope that 
your deliberations here this week are fruitful. 
Tonight I wanted to talk to you about social 
change, not revolutionary change, but rather a 
gradual change in the social and demographic 
makeup of the United States and its implications 
to the work of those of us involved on issues 
affecting Latinos. 
I will first tell you about the change and 
hopefully put it in some perspective. Then I 
will give you some information about Latino 
groups nationally. And then focus in on the 
meaning of these changes at the local level, or 
how is the browning of America affecting Latino 
communities and the cities and states in where 
they live. 
In doing the latter, I will be concentrating 
on Massachusetts, perhaps not the state with the 
largest Latino population in the country, but 
one in which the changes are having a profound 
effect. 
Staff at the Gaston Institute at UMASS-Boston 
have prepared some charts for you that I hope 
you will find helpful. My hope that after I 
present some information briefly, we can have a 
discussion of the meaning of it to you and what 
you are trying to accomplish. 
The big news of the 1990 census is the 
growing diversity in the population of the 
United States. 
From 1980 to 1990, the non-Hispanic white 
population of the United States increased by 7.8 
million people, a growth of 4.4%; while the 
population of Blacks, Asians, Latinos ~nd other 
groups had a combined growth of more than 14 
million, a rate of growth of 30.9%. 
Today, about one out of every four Americans 
is a Black, a Latino, an Asian or a person of 
another Third World origin. 
This growth has been most pronounced among 
Latitios and Asians. The national rate of growth 
for Asians nationally is a whopping 107%; for 
Latinos it is 53%. In comparison, Blacks grew 
by 13.2% and as I mentioned above, the Non-
Hispanic whites population grew only by 4.4% 












Although increases by births contributes to 
this growth, most of the growth among Latinos 
and Asians is due to immigration. Among Latinos 
immigration from Mexico and from Central 
American, has been significant in this decade. 
Among Asians, it is safe to say that a large 
chunk of that growth comes from Southeast Asia. 
Although we know that this is a fact, it is 
important that we understand that we are talking 
about a rate of immigrant growth that rivals the 
great European migrations of the early 20th 
Century. Your first chart graphs the numbers in 
millions of the immigrants that arrived during 
each decade from 1820 to 1990. As you can see, 
at 7.3 million people over the last 10 years, 
immigrant growth during this decade surpasses 
that of every previous decade with the exception 
of the decade from 1901 to 1910. 
The Boston Globe, as part of a lengthy 
analysis of the diversification of the U.S. 
population in terms of race, produced the graph 
that we reproduced with their permission. 
Again, using figures from the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, they track the growth of 
immigrants by area of origin during the same 
period. 
We tried to reproduce this . graph for you in a 
way that would make the information more clear, 
and for example, separate english speaking from 
spanish-speaking caribbean immigrants, but the 
time did not allow it. It is not perfect, but 
follow it with me, if you can. 
The line that peaks in 1901-1910, is that of 
immigration from Europe. White European 
immigrants up until 1970, accounted for the 
largest number of immigrants to the u.s .. 









US immigration by racial/ethnic 
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of every other area of the world except Africa. 
But let's look at what is happening at 
immigration from third world countries. As they 
point out 80% of immigrants came from Asia, 
Latin America and the Caribbean. The rest came 
from Europe and Africa. The growth of 
immigration from Asia, particularly since the 
1970's is clear on the graph. 
But although the graph leads one to believe 
that it is the highest, let's look at 
immigration from Mexico, Latin America and the 
Caribbean. When you add the numbers of 
immigrants from Mexico and Central and South 
America, it approaches very closely that of 
Asians. Those numbers, though, do not include 
immigration from Cuba and the Dominican Republic 
(both Caribbean nations) or the migration of 
Puerto Ricans to the United States. 
What I conclude, from this graph, is that the 
rate of movement from Latin America to the U.S. 
is perhaps the most significant factor in the 
growth of immigration in the last decade. And 
if so, the most significant factor in the 
diversification of the population of the United 
States. 
Let me talk briefly about what has fueled 
this large migration from the Third World. The 
first factor, clearly is consistent dynamic of 
migratory flows from peripheral to core areas of 
the world economic. The uneven development of 
the world economies leads to migration from the 
more marginal areas towards the core. The 
United States is a powerful world economy with 
great influence over Latin America and many 
Asian countries. The deterioration of the 
economic and political conditions in this 
section of the World, would naturally fuel 
economy towards the United States. 
Another factor is the political upheavals 
that have been experienced in the last two 
decades. Central America has been an important 
focus of instability, fueling the movement of 
refugees north. Although many of these people, 
for political reasons, are not considered 
refugees in the United States, they still make 
their way into the country in large numbers. 
South East Asia has also experienced marked 
changes in the last twenty years, fueling the 
movement of refugees allover the world, 
including the United States. 
U.S. migration policies that began to be 
implemented in the 1960's are also contributing 
to an increased migration by people of color. 
At that time, President Kennedy proposed reforms 
in immigration law that ended the preference for 
persons of European background - that preference 
had been in force since the early 1800's and 
basically barred large immigrations from the 
Caribbean and Latin America, Africa and Asia, 
except in some instances - for example the 
African slaves, the Mexican braceros and the 
Asians imported to build the railroads in 
1800's. 
The democratization of immigration law that 
took place in the 1960's, gave every country an 
equal allotment of immigrants per year. By 
definition, since there are more areas of the 
world populated by people of color, the effect 
of the democratization of the law was to 
increase the numbers of immigrants of color. It 
also served to bring the United States closer to 
the reality of the world in terms of race and 
ethnic representation. 
Recent immigration reform bills sought to 
curtail again immigration from Third World 
countries in favor of immigration from European, 
particularly Eastern European nations. Although 
reformers succeeded in imposing sanctions to 
illegal immigrants and the employers that hire 
them, the broader goals of their initiatives 
were largely defeated. What this means is that 
for the time being migration from the Third 
World will continue. 
The effect of immigration today as a 
percentage of the total U.S. population is __ 
smaller than that of the great immigration of 
the early 1900's. This is because, although in 
absolute numbers, the phenomena may be similar, 
the overall U.S. population is larger today than 
it was in 1901 and thus, the rate of immigrant 
to native born americans is smaller. But the 
fact that most immigrants today are of color -
Asian, Latin American, and African- represents a 
demographic revolution as well as a tremendous 
social change. 
Population analysis and projections of the 
U.S. minority population conducted by the Urban 
Institute point to the fact that by 2070, over 
half of the population of the u.s. will be of 
color. The minority population that we will be 
speaking about then will be white. By the year 
2000, just less than 1/3 of the U.S. population 
will be of color. 
This is a profound transformation for the 
United States. It will call int~ questions many 
of the values and principles that formed this 
nation: equality, democracy, the rights of 
individuals. It will engage us socially and 
politically for years to come. 
The United States is just now waking up to 
the magnitude of the transformation. We are in 
the first two decades of the journey that will 
take almost three quarters of a century. 
Often, it is hard to be very concerned about 
a social change that will come into fruition 
when none of us will be here. It is also hard 
to see, with all the things that are happening 
around us, the outlines of the emerging debate. 
From English only, the difficulties in the 
assimilation of immigrants of color, and the 
development of scapegoat groups among ourselves 
to the arduous work at the community level 
around issues of diversity, the growing -but 
still lacking- understanding of the dynamics of 
new immigrant communities and the work of folks 
like you, everywhere in the U.S. that, in one 
way or another are arguing that inclusion now is 
important in order to avoid violence and turmoil 
for the next 75 years. 
At the center of this transformation will be 
the Latinos in the United States. Latinos will 
be the largest minority in the country where 
racial minorities will be becoming majorities. 
How we approach this transformation, how we 
prepare ourselves and our communities for this 
process, how do we develop leaders with the 
vision that will be required, are key questions 
for Latinos everywhere. 
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Let me walk you through some additional 
figures that fill out the picture of diversity 
in America. By far the most diverse areas of 
the country are the West and the South. In the 
West, 19% of the population is Latino 7.7% is 
Asian and 5.4 % is Black; in the South 19% of 
the population is Black and 8% is Latino and 
1.3% is Asian. The Northeast is the third most 
diverse area. In the Northeast, 11% of the 
population is Black, 7.4% is Latino and 2.6% is 
Asian. 
Projections by the Urban Institute in 
Washington D.C. indicate that by the year 2000, 
this pattern will be maintained, but that some 
regions will experience more change than others. 
The West Coast will lead the way, followed by 
the Northeast. The South will experience less 
growth in minority populations, although its 
share of minorities will continue to be very 
large. The Midwest will continue to lag far 
behind. 
When we examine the geographic dispersion of 
Latinos, we see that Latinos congregate in the 
West and the South, 75% of Latinos live in these 
areas. But if we look at the 10 states with the 
largest numeric increases of Latino population 
over the last decade, one is in the midwest 
(illinois), two are southern states (Texas and 
Florida), three are in the Northeast (New York, 
New Jersey and Massachusetts), and four are in 
the West (Arizona, California, New Mexico, 
Washington); seven out of ten are in the 
Northeast and the West. 
Let's now take a look at the Latino 
population. For this analysis we used 1980 and 
1990 U.S. Census figures as well as the Current 
Population Survey for 1988, 1989 and 1990. 
In terms of composition, we can see that 
Mexicans account for the largest percentage of 
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south Americans together account for 14% of the 
population. Cubans account for just under 5%. 
Other Latino, which really means Dominicans, 
since everyone else is accounted for in the 
other categories, account for almost 7%. So the 
ranking should go: Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, 
Dominicans, Cubans, and everyone else. 
Although the categories are not the same, a 
comparison between 1980 and 1990 figures 
provides some light as to which Latino 
populations are growing. The share of Mexicans 
of the Latino population increased by just over 
4% in the decade. Both Cubans and Puerto Ricans 
decreased 
in their share of the Latino population, while 
the combination of Dominicans, Central and South 
Americans remained roughly the same. 
Latinos are a young population as compared to 
the overall population. Among Latino groups, 
median age is higher among Cuban Americans and 
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lowest among Mexican Americans. The youth of 
the Latino population has great implications for 
policy in the area of education. It also has 
great implications in the area of political 
participation; almost half of the Latino 
population is not able to vote because of age. 
We prepared a few indicators on Latinos for 
this discussion. We have data on the percent of 
Latinos and non-Latinos that have educational 
attainment at the top levels of the educational 
scale. 
In comparison to non-Latinos, Latinos lag 
well behind the rest in educational attainment. 
Just over half of the Latino population has an 
education of four years or more compared to 80% 
of the non-Latino population. As is true for 
the non-Latino population, the percent of 
Latinos with a high school degree or more 
increased from 1970 to 1990. But the rate of 
increase was much higher for non-Latinos. 
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Educational attainment of high school or more 
among Latinos increased by 19 points from 1970 
to 1990, and lags well behind the 27 point 
increase achieved by other groups. 
The rate of attainment of a college education 
among Latinos in more than half of that of the 
non-Latino population. In 1990, just 9% of the 
Latino population had 4 years of college or more 
as compared to 22% for the non-Latino 
population. The percent of both Latinos and 
non-Latinos attaining a college education or 
more increased over the last 20 years, but the 
patterns are somewhat different. For non-
Latinos, the, pattern has been one of sustained 
increases over the 20 year period, doubling the 
rate over the last two decades. The rate of 
Latinos has also increased, in fact it doubled 
between 1970 and 1988, but by 1990 it had begun 
to decline. 
Among Latino groups, the highest rates of 
educational attainment -as measured by high 
school completion- are among Central and South 
American and "other Hispanic". Mexican 
Americans have the lowest rates of high school 
completion among Latino groups. Educational 
attainment of four years of college or more is 
highest among Cuban Americans and lowest among 
Mexican Americans. 
Latinos labor market participation of males -
the percentage of Latinos that are working or 
actively seeking a job- ranges from the high 
sixties among Puerto Ricans to the mid-eighties 
among Central and South Americans. A similar 
pattern is observed among women from different 
national groups. The labor force participation 
of Latino men is in fact higher than that of 
non-Latinos but the participation of women is 
significantly lower. Through the 1980's, the 
overall labor force participation of Latino men, 
remained stable in the high 70's; labor force 
'-1"'\ ...,"'. " • "'." "'... • 1"'\'"'' '" II 1"'\" "'.,. ." 1"'\ • ..._ 
MALE AND FEMALE 16+ 
85 
80 
80.5 80.1 79.6 
~7 78.2 78.5 7~0 r:.3 7:~ EJ 
o 0 








_ ~ ~ ~ _ ru ~ 
~ 48.9 + 1-
47.3 
45 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
o LATINO .... ' E + LATINO FEMALE <> NON LATINO MALE t. NON LATINO FEMALE 
UNEMPLOYMENT RATES: MARCH 1982-1990 




















o '--~ """--""" 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1988 1987 1988 1989 1990 
MEDIAN EARNINGS: 1981-1988 
1987 S. (Morch CPS) 
22 
2\ 20.303 20.498 20.582 
19~ 
e " 20 
19.193 19.Cl86 







13.001 12.974 13._ 
13 12.425 12.715 12.384 12.527 
12 
n 10.478 10.745 
10,883 
6 
~ 10 9.455 9.803 ~~ 9.077 9.097 6 6 9 8.~44 8.ffi4 8.299 8.391 8~ 8~S9 8,554 
8 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1988 1987 1988 
0 latina Male + l.ItIna f_1e (> Non l.ItIna male '" Non l.ItIna f_1e 
participation for non-Latino males was also 
stable in the mid 70's. Among women, the labor 
force participation of both Latinas and non-
Latinas increased significantly during the 
1980's. 
Still, unemployment remains a problem among 
Latinos. During the 1980's, unemployment rates 
among Latinos were considerable higher than 
those of non-Latinos. Unemployment rates were 
highest among Mexican Americans and Puerto 
Ricans at the end of the decade. 
Median earnings for Latinos were 
significantly lower than those of non-Latinos. 
Among both men and women, Mexican American men 
had the lowest mean earnings of all Latino 
groups during the late 1980's. Cuban American 
men had the highest mean earnings of all groups; 
among women, the earnings of Puerto Rican, Cuban 
and other Hispanic women are comparable while 
those of Mexican American and Central and South 
American were lower. 
The high unemployment rates, the lower rate 
of participation of women in the labor force and 
the lower wages Latinos earn in their jobs has 
led to considerable rates of poverty in the 
population. 
Rates of povertyam~ng Latino families has 
remained more than twice that of non-Latino 
families during the 1980's. Poverty among 
Latino families reached a high of 27% in 1983 
(compared to 11% among non-Latinos). By the end 
of the decade, both rates had decreased but 
Latino families still had rates of poverty 
hovering around 25%. 
Poverty is higher among Puerto Ricans than 
among any other Latino group. In 1988, poverty 
rates for Puerto Rican families reached 38%, 
four times the rate of non-Latino families. By 
the end of the decade, they were at 30%. 
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Poverty rates are lowest among Cubans, with 
their rates of poverty being lower than the 
Latino average but significantly higher than 
that of non-Latinos. 
More than one quarter of Mexican American 
families are poor, which is about average for 
the Latino population and just under three times 
that of non-Latino families. 
Lower educational attainments and a 
population that is by and large working and 
poor, characterizes the situation of Latinos 
nationally. 
There is a lot of debate about the future of 
the Latino population in the United States. On 
the one hand some argue that their immigrant 
characteristics -language proficiency, low 
educational attainment, etc- in time will 
disappear for, at least, some of the groups and 
that Latinos may, with time, follow the path of 
earlier immigrants. 
Others argue that Latinos are behaving 
structurally like racial minorities, that is 
that their immigrant status is secondary to 
their race and ethnic background in the outcomes 
of their economic and social insertion. 
But regardless of the ultimate outcome, the 
fact is that the situation in Latino communities 
is a serious one. No where in the United States 
is the situation worse than in the state I come 
from, Massachusetts. Latino educational 
outcomes, earnings, and poverty rates are the 
worst of any Latino community in the Unites 
States. 
Let me retake the initial discussion, in 
explaining the Massachusetts situation. 
The New England States, particularly 
Massachusetts have experienced among the highest 
rates of growth of Blacks, Latinos and Asians of 
any area of the country. If we look at the 5 
states with the highest rates of growth for each 
of these groups, we find that 3 out of 5 of the 
States is a New England State. In 
Massachusetts, over the last 20 years the 
population of Non-Hispanic whites (European 
background) has decreased by 4.5% while the 
minority populations have increased by (3.6%). 
Although, the state and the region remain 
primarily white, the large presence and high 
growth of the Black, Latino and Asians 
population is a significant change in the 
region. 
This region has been racially homogeneous for 
most of its history, - aside from the pockets of 
Blacks in Hartford, New Haven and Boston, the 
population has been ethnically diverse, but 
racially homogeneous. The experiences in the 
west and South during the earlier part of the 
century, largely by-passed New England and 
Massachusetts. 
Unlike Blacks, who congregate primarily in 
the South central area of Boston, Latino 
settlements are more widespread throughout the 
city and the State. About half of the Latino 
population of the State lives in Boston; but the 
highest rates of growth have taken place outside 
of the capital city. 
There are large Latino concentrations in 
Lawrence for example, where Latinos account for 
42% of the population of the city; in Holyoke 
and Chelsea, Latinos account for 31% of the 
population of these cities. Latinos account for 
10.8% of the population of Boston. 
Massachusetts has led the nation in the 
process of de-industrialization and in the re-
structuring of the economy. De-
industrialization in the city of Boston, for 
example, began in the 1930's and by the 1980's 
industry in the city has almost disappeared. It 
has been replaced by a high powered service 
economy and a high technology industry which, 
unlike California and Texas, emphasizes the 
least labor intensive aspects of the industry -
software and systems development rather than 
assembly of computer equipment, for example. 
Latinos, by and large work in the dying 
manufacturing sector of the state. In Boston, 
Latinos are the cleaners, the food handlers and 
the clerks of the city's financial, health, and 
service industries. Poverty among Latinos in 
Boston, for example, declined very little during 
the city's boom of the 1980's. In fact, among 
families headed by women, poverty increased. 
75% of the Latino children in Boston live in a 
poor household. 
Although the growth of the Latino population 
has had important effects in their labor market 
experience, it has had a tremendous effect in 
the social and political experience of the 
group. We can safely say that the high rate of 
growth has not allowed city and state government 
to abreast of changes within Latino communities 
specifically, and in general, with the dramatic 
changes in the demographics of the population. 
With the notable exception of the Gateway 
Cities Legislation in the late 1980's, there has 
been little accounting by state and ~ity 
government of the growth of "newcomers" and 
little attention has been paid to their very 
pressing needs. 
Latinos, by and large, have been invisible to 
policy makers. There are several reasons. 
Latinos are a young population; median age for 
Latinos in Massachusetts is 21. This means that 
half of the population cannot vote and has not 
political participation. Even in those areas in 
which Latinos compose high percentages of then 
population, there are no Latino elected 
officials. In Lawrence, for example, the lack 
of district representation forces Latinos to run 
city-wide rather than from within their own 
base; no Latino has ever held office in 
Lawrence. By and large, Latinos are not a 
political threat, at this point, to elected 
officials. 
But Latinos have been invisible to government 
policy makers in other way§ _ as well. Latino 
rates of employment in city and state government 
in Massachusetts are very low, lower than those 
of Latinos in other areas of the country. 
Although there have been some highly visible 
appointments, such as Chair of the Massachusetts 
Commission Against Discrimination and 
Commissioner of Welfare, the truth is that 
highly placed appointed officials rely on the 
work of staff, staff that is primarily non-
Latino. In this context, there is little that 
an official alone can do. 
There are other structural sources of 
invisibility. For example, up to 1989, there 
was no information on birth or death rates for 
Latinos in Massachusetts. Today, there are few 
economic indicators in the state that 
disaggregate Latinos from whites or blacks. 
This absence of Latino information in the 
routinely available data handled by 
administrators and policy makers in the state is 
a serious structural problem, one that repeats 
itself in other areas of the United States. 
The result has been that even under the best 
intentioned policy makers, with money to develop 
initiatives directed at problems facing Latinos 
in the state -such as model employment and 
training programs and extensive social service 
initiatives- Latinos were largely bypassed by 
these reforms. 
How were they by-passed? Because the general 
policies although laudable and sound, did not 
take into account the needs of Latinos at the 
time of implementation. 
An example of this is the employment and 
training program in Massachusetts, a model 
program that, by most accounts, has been highly 
successful in placing AFDC women in jobs. 
Latinas participated actively in ET programs, 
particularly in programs operated at the 
community level - most participants were 
involved in a community based program. That 
they did right, they involved community based 
contractors and in doing so resolved a strong 
barrier to participation. 
But what they did wrong is that they did not 
pay attention to the kinds of programs that 
would be successful with a population that 
required both remedial education and skills 
training. No combined programs were ever 
funded, in fact they were discouraged. There 
was never any connection articulated between 
educational and skills training programs. There 
was no effort to develop strong linkages to the 
sources of employment. 
The result is that although Latinas 
participated, they participated primarily in 
education only programs that did not lead to 
jobs. Outcomes -in terms of placement and wages 
- for Latino participation were the worse of any 
group. From my perspective, a very large 
opportunity was missed. 
Like this one there are many examples of good 
policy not having the desired effect in 
particular sectors of the population; in 
Massachusetts, more often than not, that sector 
happens to be Latinos. 
Lack of information that is readily 
available, lack of Latino personnel in policy 
positions and the non-threatening nature of the 
Latino population in the voting booth are 
potentiated by the tremendous effect on the 
capacity for advocacy and strategy development 
that the tremendous growth and needs of the 
Latino population represents for Latino 
community based organizations. 
The sustained high rate of growth, 
particularly in the absence of official 
response, has placed a great burden on Latino 
communities to develop transitional and ongoing 
supports that would help stabilize a community 
undergoing this high rate of change. Although 
there has been considerable institutional 
development in the Latino community in Boston 
and Massachusetts, the growth of these 
institutions has not kept up with the increases 
in the population and its needs. 
Strengthening the institutional base of 
Latino communities is critical both for the 
healthy survival of these communities under the 
stress of such rapid growth, but also for the 
capacity of Latinos to participate actively in 
shaping policies and programs that affect their 
daily lives and their future. 
There is a lot of debate about the extent to 
which community based organizations, which in 
many cases are service organizations, are an 
asset or a liability to communities. Some argue 
that the dependency in government programs on 
the part of these agencies has changed their 
character and effectiveness. 
It is important to understand, though, that 
this dependency is fostered by lack of resources 
that permit more creative and innovative 
approaches at the community level. That 
dependency in government programs is a strategy 
for survival for organizations that, in most 
cases, form the institutional backbone of Latino 
communities across the United States. 
Strengthening the institutional base of 
Latino communities is a critical priority at 
this juncture. Community organizations should 
be encouraged to expand their vision and 
endeavor at the community level from one focused 
solely on service to one focused on the 
community development needs -whatever they may 
be. This may include a range of initiatives 
such as voter registration and citizenship 
education to community based economic 
development activity to the experimentation in 
model programs of employment and training. 
Strengthening the power, reach and 
effectiveness of community based organizations 
along a range of areas that are not now even 
considered is critical for the development that 
is necessary for Latinos to take their place in 
the new majority. Community based 
organizations are the best training grounds for 
leadership in our communities; they are also the 
best springboard to the participation of 
Latinos, that are really knowledgeable of 
community conditions and needs, in the debate on 
public policy at the local level. 
A great Massachusetts politician - former 
Speaker of the House of Representatives Tip 
O'neill always used to say that all politics are 
local. In the era of the new federalism, that 
is certainly true. The federal government has, 
in large measure, abandoned the terrain to the 
states and localities in the PQlicy making that 
most closely affects people's lives - schools, 
economic development, job strategies, etc. 
The results of the new federalism are just 
beginning to be felt. The great diversity of 
experience from one state to the other in terms 
of life chances and opportunities will surely 
begin to be documented with this census. 
In Massachusetts, the most insidious of the 
results of these policies at the federal and 
state levels are making themselves felt with a 
vengeance due to the economic crisis facing the 
state. I mention them here today, because they 
may be a harbinger of things to come. 
Over the last three years, we are seeing that 
the fiscal crisis in the state is leading to the 
abandonment of municipal systems, particularly 
the schools. The tax payers' revolt is taking 
the shape of having large sectors of the middle 
class resist supporting educational services and 
other municipal se:r:vices. In Massachusetts, the 
state has just released a report on the 
tremendous crisis affecting several school 
districts: all four of the school districts 
highlighted are districts where Latinos 
predominate : Chelsea, Lawrence, Holyoke, and 
Brockton. In the case of Chelsea, the school 
system is already being managed by a private 
entity, Boston University, in a move highly 
contested by the large Latino community of the 
city. The Lawrence and Holyoke school systems 
are about to be placed in receivership. 
But the problem extends beyond the schools. 
A month ago the mayor of the city of Chelsea was 
replaced with a receiver appointed by Governor 
Weld because the elected city government was 
unable to manage the city's affairs. Lawrence, 
Massachusetts is widely discussed as the next 
city where the Governor will have to appoint a 
receiver. Both are cities where the Latino 
population is very high and where the 
demographic changes have been profound and 
extremely quick. 
It is still too early to tell whether the 
examples of abandonment and anarchy that we are 
witnessing in Chelsea and Lawrence following the 
rapid transformation of the population will 
become a pattern in other communities undergoing 
similar change. But it is clearly a development 
to be watched very carefully. 
The demographic transformation of the 
population is an incontrovertible fact, whose 
outlines we are just beginning to witness and 
whose outcome will not come in our lifetime. 
Whether this will be a peaceful process will 
depend on the basis that we set now, it will 
rely on the values and the principles that our 
generation establishes. 
That Latinos will be at the center of this 
process is also clear. And as I said earlier, 
how we approach this transformation, how we 
prepare ourselves and our communities for this 
process, how do we develop leaders with the 
vision that will be required, are key questions 
for Latinos everywhere. 
I have taken a lot of your time and I 
wanted to leave some space for discussion. I 
hope that I have provided you with some ideas as 
to the challenge we face together. 
SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS FOR LATINO SUBGROUPS. MARCH 1988, 1989, 1990 
Mexican Puerto Cuban Central Other 
Rican or South Hispanic 
American 
Population (thousands) 
1988 12,110 2,471 1,035 2,242 1,573 
1989 12,565 2,330 1,069 2,544 1,567 
1990 13,305 2,180 1,014 2,842 1,437 
Median age (yrs) 
1988 23.9 24.9 38.7 27.6 29.7 
1989 23.6 26.8 41. 4 28.4 29.8 
1990 24.1 27.0 39.1 28.0 31. 1 
Percent male 
1988 51. 5 46.7 50.9 47.3 48.7 
1989 51.0 47.9 48.0 50.0 48.9 
1990 51. 2 47.7 48.4 48.8 48.1 
Percent female 
1988 48.5 53.3 49.1 52.7 51. 4 
1989 49.0 52.1 52.0 50.0 51. 1 
1990 48.8 52.3 51. 6 51. 2 51. 9 
Percent with 4 yrs of HS or more 
1988 44.6 50.7 60.5 63.8 65.2 
1989 42.7 54.0 63.0 66.0 63.7 
1990 44.1 55.5 63.5 58.5 68.7 
Percent with 4 yrs of college or more 
1988 7.1 9.6 17.2 16.5 14.0 
1989 6.1 9.8 19.8 17.5 12.9 
1990 5.4 9.7 20.2 15.6 15.2 
Source. March 1988, 1989, 1990 Current Population Survey 
LABOR MARKET CHARACTERISTICS FOR LATINO SUBGROUPS 
MARCH 1988, 1989, 1990 
Male labor force participation rates (16+) 
1988 80.4 68.6 77.2 84.8 74.5 
1989 82.8 69.6 76.3 85.4 72.2 
1990 81.2 69.2 74.9 83.7 75.3 
Female labor force participation rates (16+) 
1988 52.4 40.9 53.6 61.7 51. 6 
1989 52.7 41.7 49.1 61.7 53.2 
1990 52.9 41. 4 57.8 61.0 57.0 
Male unemployment rates 
1988 11.0 8.2 4.1 5.6 10.2 
1989 8.3 12.1 6.4 4.6 6.7 
1990 8.6 8.2 6.3 6.9 6.2 
Female unemployment rates 
1988 7.7 10.5 1.7 3.9 7.7 
1989 8.8 5.0 5.7 8.3 5. 1 
1990 9 . 8 9. 1 5. 1 6.3 5.9 
Male median earnings in previous years (civilians 15+) 
1988 11,791 15,672 16,634 13,105 15,574 
1989 12,107 16,122 17,572 14,930 16,030 
1990 12,527 18,222 19,336 15,067 17,486 
Female median earnings in previous years (civilians 15+) 
1988 7,912 11,327 11,364 8,056 11,239 
1989 8,110 11,241 11,966 9,936 12,104 
1990 8,874 12,812 12,880 10,083 11,564 
Percent of families below the poverty level in previous year 
1988 25.5 37.9 13.8 18.9 26.1 
1989 24.9 30.8 16.9 16.6 20.6 
1990 25.7 30.4 12.5 16.8 15.8 
Source, March 1988, 1989, 1990 Current Population Survey 
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